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How should I act? And how should I not act? I must accept and reject, 
prefer and discard. How should I ultimately manage to do all this?
—Zhuangzi “Autumn Floods”
As long as we stay in the dichotomy between acting thus or not 
acting thus, we defeat our capacity for self-transformation.
—Guo Xiang
Philosophy of Action
This is a book on philosophy of action. Chinese philosophy is action-oriented 
to the extent that, not only most metaphysical, epistemological, and other 
theoretical speculations are put to the service of praxes and are meant to be 
enacted, practiced, embodied, or realized, but also that the process of acting 
itself becomes one of the most fundamental topics of inquiry. Yet Chinese 
philosophy of action greatly differs from the action theory one may find in 
contemporary academic analytical circles insofar as it does not attempt to 
identify the mental states that cause actions, such as intentions, desires, or 
beliefs, nor the conditions of possibility of agency, such as free will. The issues 
that interested early Chinese philosophers had more to do with discerning 
the guidelines and evaluating the efficacy of different models of action. They 
asked normative questions regarding how to act and how not to act, some­
what betraying an ethical orientation but mostly illuminating their leading 
concern with world-embedded agency and self-efficacy. Early Chinese phi­
losophy of action aims at developing strategies that enable us to manage our 
own lives in relation with others and our shifting contexts, which include
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2 INTRODUCTION
both human and nonhuman actors; efficaciously achieving our goals; 
shaping our own lives and controlling the outcomes of our actions; coping 
with openness, uncertainty, and change in ordinary life; and creating order 
and harmony with/in nature and society.
Interconnected Entities
From these lines of inquiry, we can already see that the preoccupation with 
human action and its efficacy translates a larger preoccupation with the re­
lationship between the person and her worlds, the agent and her contexts. 
Philosophy of action in the context of early China is profoundly different from 
its counterpart in the contemporary Western philosophical narrative because 
it begins from an irreducibly relational notion of agency instead of some dis­
crete subject. Agency, the capacity to act and its manifestation, was understood 
relationally in early China. Everything that we do as agents, including the con­
struction of our identities as agents, is the product of our relations with others. 
All discourses regarding action start from the realization that nothing can 
be defined independently from other things for all creatures are embedded 
in nets of constituting relationships that facilitate, condition, and potentially 
constrain their self, thinking, emotions, preferences, capacities, and options. 
This is what we call a relational ontology, in which relations are constitutive 
and primary, not subordinated to the presumption of individual entities prior 
to second-order relations as we would find in a substance ontology.
Among these nets of constituting relationships, a primordial axis is that 
of one’s own body. Our bodies do not exist in isolation; they can only be 
found and recognized in their relation with the bodies of other “entities” 
or wu '■$). A fundamental concept in Classical Chinese philosophy, wu may 
be translated as a discrete entity with distinct physical boundaries. It may 
refer to an object, an animal, a plant, a person, or any hybrid combina­
tion as long as it has a perceivably distinct bodily shape that distinguishes 
it from other entities. That is, for something to be an entity it must dis­
play certain perceivable features that make it discernible from all other 
types of entity (the tree as tree and the monkey as monkey) and recog­
nized in its individuality as such (this tree and me). As the Xing zi ming chu 
§ 'np lH defines it, wu is that which makes itself apparent (xianzhe zhi wei 
wu In making itself apparent in its distinctiveness, an entity 
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embraces particularity and excludes ambiguity. Interconnectedness is not 
at odd with determinacy, and it certainly does not imply chaos, confusion, 
or undifferentiatedness.
In early China, the world is a collection of distinct yet interconnected wu. 
We often encounter the term “ten thousand wu” (wanwu MW), which liter­
ally means many different entities and metaphorically points to a catalogue 
of all the possible types of entities that may appear in the world. The world is 
then a collection of perceivable material bodies in interconnection: bodies 
that depend on, determine, define, affect, constitute, and empower one an­
other, and which are in turn embedded in the larger bodies of Heaven and 
Earth. There cannot be a world without relations.
Relationality
In its minimal account, relationality merely means that agents cannot be con­
sidered in isolation from their environments, that agency cannot be sourced 
to an individual actor. Instead, actors must be located within the net of 
relationships that affect, prevent, or enhance their possibilities to act as well 
as the outcomes of their actions. In principle, relationality does not imply in­
terdependence. A basic or weak account of relationality conceives of different 
entities in the world as they interplay with one another and understands 
courses of action as responses to particular situations, contexts, and other 
actors. In this regard, we will see that some early Chinese philosophers, while 
thinking relationally, hypostasize conceptual entities such as fate (ming ’pp) 
and the times (s/ii ) that are perceived to act separately from and in opposi­
tion to humans. Fate—short for everything that happens without human in­
tervention and remains out of human control—becomes disconnected from 
humans. While affecting human life and playing an important role in human 
emotions, thoughts, and actions, at ontological and epistemological levels 
fate remains its own separate entity beyond human grasp and comprehen­
sion, unaffected by human influence.
Beyond the basic notion that everything exists in interrelation, a more 
radical or strong account of relationality implies interdependency and 
oneness. The bird cannot become and act as a bird without the air that 
sustain its wings, the tree wherein its niche is nested, or the worms that 
nourish its body. Humans, too, as one more type of wu, find themselves in 
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a relation of co-dependence with other entities. The radical account also 
posits a maxim of oneness by arguing that there is no such thing as the 
“external” world. It ruptures the dichotomies of inner-outer, self-world, 
and agent-context by including every single aspect of the world within the 
agents field of activity. In this way, fate, or those events and states believed 
to happen without the person’s intervention, are integrated as an enabling 
part of the person that facilitates her being and becoming, similar to her 
own body and the ground she steps on. In an interdependent account of 
relationality as oneness, the world becomes the agent’s playground, and 
action is always co-action—the rising together of an event via multiple 
human and nonhuman agencies.
Efficacious Agency
Whether it is in the weak or strong accounts, the preoccupation with effi­
cacious agency becomes particularly pressing due to the acknowledg­
ment of these nets of interrelations between entities. If our actions do not 
purely spring from ourselves; if our beliefs, preferences, and decisions are 
a product of our relations to others; moreover, if we depend on other enti­
ties to act, how can we ever exercise any control over our actions, and how 
can we achieve self-efficacy? The conundrum underlying these questions 
is illustrated in the anecdote of Zhuang Zhou wandering around Diaoling 
Park ff In the story, Zhuangzi intends to hunt a huge bird,
which intends to hunt a mantis, which intends to hunt a cicada. By the end, 
Zhuangzi is “hunted” by the forester, who scolds him and asks him to leave. 
Each hunter is also about to be hunted, but none of them has any aware­
ness of it. The anecdote points at the difficulty in understanding the extent 
to which all entities are co-dependent and entangled with one another. The 
animals of the anecdote, fully absorbed in hunting their prey, are unaware of 
everything around them, including the fact that they themselves are being 
hunted. Even Zhuangzi, who takes the role of external and reflexive observer, 
remains oblivious to his own multiple dependencies with others. This una­
voidably raises the question: If, for any given entity, there are plural levels of 
interrelatedness and co-dependence affecting his actions, how is it possible 
to act with efficacy?
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Adapting
As an answer to this question and the larger concern with world-embedded 
agency, early Chinese philosophers devised and practiced a form of rela­
tional action that we do not find in other philosophical traditions and which 
I have termed adaptive agency or adapting (yin B). A preliminary definition 
of the concept of adapting states that “adapting is abandoning oneself and 
taking entities as standard” (Guanzi
“Xinshu shang” The agent decides a course of action (what to do)
in accordance with the temporary situation in which he is embedded—that 
is, all the entities and potential actors with which he interacts in a particular 
situation. If the world is a collection of all the interrelated entities that may 
appear, we may say that a situation is a coming together of interconnected 
and interdependent entities in an intentionally discriminated and tempo­
rarily shared space-time. For an adaptive agent, the situation becomes the 
main parameters by which to evaluate the suitability of a course of action. 
Only this full adequacy agent-situation will guarantee a maximum de­
gree of efficacy with the best possible use of resources, competencies, and 
affordances.
As a descriptor of successful action, efficacy depends on what is in­
tended to be achieved, and hence it will be defined differently depending 
on the agent’s goals. Adapting is an open-ended strategy of action which 
allows the agent to achieve any potential goal, and hence remains inde­
pendent from and susceptible to be put to the service of any concrete 
practices and ideologies. Texts that advocate for adapting argue that it 
produces the best possible response for an agent of particular features 
and conditions, in a specific situation, given certain goals (although these 
may in turn be adjusted to the situation). Chinese discourses on adapting 
shaped an exceptional philosophy of action that asked the person to con­
stantly adjust to varying circumstances in order to better respond to the 
manifold situations humans confront in a lifetime, including during the 
transformations due to bodily change, sickness, and death. Overall, the 
adaptive person is a situational, contextual, reflexive, flexible, and cre­
ative agent capable of designing strategies ad hoc: unique and transient 
courses of action for specific, nonpermanent, and nongeneralizable life 
problems.
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Contrast with Other Models
Adapting contrasts with more unilateral models of action that early Chinese 
philosophers proposed for achieving control under shifting, uncertain, or 
constraining circumstances: the prescriptive model, based on conformity to 
pre-established, non-negotiable, fixed guidelines for action; and the forceful 
model, based on imposing the agents arbitrary preferences and desires. 
Much like adaptive agency, the prescriptive and forceful models are rela­
tional, the differences lying in how each respond to situations and contexts, 
their manner of interacting with other actors, and their treatment of sources 
of authority and potential constraints.
The analogy of reading an article may be used to illustrate the contrast be­
tween prescriptive, forceful, and adaptive agency. We may read an article with 
the intention of learning everything it tells, for example when the author is 
authoritative or we have no significant expertise. Or we may read an article 
with the intention to refute it, when we are, for instance, competing experts 
in a field. We may instead do a critical reading, considering each piece of evi­
dence and arguments in all fairness, using the convincing ones to build on and 
elaborate and introducing limiting conditions when suitable. The first reader, 
whom we may call prescriptive, looks at the text as a dogmatic teaching which 
must be abided by. The second, the forceful reader, takes a biased look at the 
text in order to impose his own preferred interpretation. The critical reader 
decides on which ideas stand according to the evidence provided by the author 
and her own expertise, taking into account as much available information be­
fore evaluating how to approach each thesis and offer her final observations. 
Now consider that these readers had different goals: a student who must re­
peat verbatim a theory in an exam, a graduate student asked to argue against 
a theory in class, a scholar looking for different approaches to solve an issue. 
Different goals entail that different reading strategies be applied. The adaptive 
agent can do prescriptive, forceful, or critical readings depending on what the 
situation requires. Adaptive agents adhere to no model of action; they decide 
on what to do according to contextual and situational demands.
The Co-Action Paradigm
The concept and praxis of adapting is a testimony to the assumption of 
co-dependence inherent to strong forms of relationality. These imply 
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that not only humans or intentional actors act, but that they are in turn 
acted upon by everything around them, including nonsubjective and 
nonintentional entities.
Affordances are the possibilities that entities furnish to us, as in the 
Daodejing the emptiness of the house allows room for lodging and
in the Zhuangzi the tree affords a shade in which to lie down. Entities’ 
affordances act on human and other subjective agents by modifying their 
behavior: they affect, inspire, enable, encourage, or forbid. The entities with 
which an agent is interrelated in a given situation become co-actors in the 
course of action that is raised. Moreover, the situation itself becomes a partic­
ipant in the action, for when the agent is aware of a situation, this awareness 
modifies his manner of response. In this way, adaptive agents acknowledge 
that all actions are enabled by the world and all strategies of action must 
be devised in accordance to the features of the entities with which they are 
interacting.
The Classical Chinese conception of agency can be summarized in the 
co-action paradigm. The co-action paradigm dictates that there is neither 
a purely individual agent whose actions would entirely originate from the 
inside—beliefs, preferences, desires (conventional autonomy)—nor a fully 
external world separate from the agent’s inner realm that would determine 
his actions (conventional heteronomy). All actions are collective events: they 
necessitate multiple agencies in joint collaboration. Some of these agencies 
possess awareness and intentionality (like humans) and others do not (like 
objects, concepts, and laws).
Once we have acknowledged the extent to which intentional agents are af­
fected by their complex connections to other entities, environment, contexts, 
and situations, we cannot keep acting as if we were independent subjects 
with fully autonomous control. Adapting becomes the smartest form of in­
tentional and purposive action for a relational understanding of the world. 
Adapting is always inter-acting (acting in response to others) and co-acting 
(acting along with others, including nonhuman others). In this way, adaptive 
actions—those which start from an understanding of the interdependency of 
all entities in a rising situation and put it to use—prove to be more efficacious 
than other types, such as the forceful or the prescriptive.
Adaptive agency is not fully controlled by the human side of the co­
action paradigm. But in the same way that we cannot understand an ac­
tion as springing from an individual and independent agent alone (inner), 
neither should we favor the other side of the co-action paradigm, namely
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the nonsubjective and nonintentional world (outer). Adapting does not 
imply determination or incapacity to do otherwise (budeyi An
efficacious use of the world’s affordances consists in creatively shaping and 
reappropriating them. Accordingly, adapting is a contextually creative way 
of acting and a timely confluence between actors that raises a new and 
suitable event.
A Note on Methodology
Adapting was not the prerogative of any school of thought or group of 
experts in early China. It appears across texts of the most diverse intellectual 
affiliations and epistemic backgrounds, associated with different goals and 
purposes, and inserted into different contexts of validity, such as the socio­
political, the military, the metaphysical, the epistemological, the ethical, and 
the environmental. In tracing, locating, and interpreting the Chinese philos­
ophy of adapting, I have worked with the master texts, today considered the 
classical philosophical corpus, but also with the political, military, historical, 
and mantic literature. Early China, much as many other early civilizations, 
was a predisciplinary culture. Our endeavor to do a philosophical study does 
not warrant that we only work with the texts that we today happen to classify 
as philosophical. I treat all materials that deal with the notion and practice of 
adapting as equally legitimate sources for my inquiry. In the same vein, I use 
received as well as found materials.
Precisely thanks to the study of found and excavated manuscripts, we have 
learned that most of the classical texts were composed by different hands 
over long periods of time, that many of them were composites of preex­
isting materials, that they did not have a stable or closed form until much 
later in history, and that the book-author format in which we see them today 
misleads us in presupposing for them a certain linearity, unity, identity, and 
coherence. Therefore, I do not treat texts compiled under a single title as in­
herently sharing an intellectual identity and coherence by virtue of their pur­
ported authorship, nor as opposed to other texts that were handed down to 
us in a different compilation.
In other words, I reject the notions of author, book, and school of thought 
as a priori legitimate hermeneutical principles for the early period. Instead of 
philosophizing at the level of the book (always associated with an author and/ 
or a school of thought), I philosophize at the level of the unit of argument. 
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The units of coherent meaning and argument do not need to extend to an en­
tire book compilation. They do not even need to extend to a complete chapter 
of the transmitted book. The unit of argument may go as long as a chapter or 
as short as a passage or extend through several passages. We may also find 
these units compiled in different books that have not been historically attrib­
uted to the same author.
In this study, I find context and source of meaningful exegesis not in the 
pre-established and fixed categories of book and author, but in more fluid 
textual, literary, conceptual, philosophical, and historical connections. I look 
for coherence among textual ideas within one or several texts, no matter 
whether these ideas appear in a single chapter or across chapters; in a single 
book or across books attributed to different authors and schools of thought. 
In sum, I let the philosophical proposals and problems, concepts, images, 
and ways of literary argumentation themselves sustain coherence and a con­
text for comparing similarities and differences between formulations and to 
thereby create philosophical systems beyond the connections that the tradi­
tional mode of downward classification inclines us to make.
1
What Is Adaptive Agency?
Overview
This chapter provides an illustrated guide to the Chinese philosophy of 
adapting, covering the following seven core aspects: the design of strategies 
ad hoc, the lack of constant standards to select the right course of action, the 
difference between constitutive standards and structural goals, the radical 
question: how to act in a world without standards, adapting as a procedural 
meta-model of action, how to train in adaptability, and how masters edu­
cated others in adaptive agency.
Although for the sake of conciseness one base text will be used to illus­
trate each point, the seven core aspects of adapting appear across early 
texts traditionally ascribed to different schools of thought, and should not 
be identified with purely Legalist, Confucian, or Daoist concerns.
Strategies Ad Hoc
Adaptive agents employ strategies ad hoc: transient courses of action 
designed to respond to the specific demands of a moment. Adapting 
implies not adhering to fixed guidelines for action even when a plan of ac­
tion has previously proven successful to achieve a goal. The success of a plan 
of action lies in its being produced as an intimate response to the partic­
ular circumstances in which the agent is immersed. These circumstances, 
bound by time and space, can hardly repeat in the future. Therefore, ac­
tion strategies must be as transient as the circumstances in which they are 
embedded.
The Han Feizi’s parable of the hare serves to illustrate
this point. After exposing how the kings of the past responded to the 
history-bound and culturally determined needs of their people in their 
different epochs (i.e., the need for cooking to protect from raw meat
Adapting. Mercedes Valmisa, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2021.
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infections or the need for channeling water in flooding times), the pas­
sage closes,
±ttt< , ba
g^±ttt< , , A&S4 , Stitt
A A < ffl < , , % A , « OI fflm , H
WOWtt , MWM , , ffiWO.
WSz® , '^tttZR , 1
Now suppose there had been someone who joined the pieces of wood or 
drilled wood to make fire in the age of the Xiahou clan. He would certainly 
have been ridiculed by Gun and Yu. Suppose that there had been someone 
who opened drainage channels in the times of the Yin and Zhou. He would 
certainly have been ridiculed by Tang and Yu. That being so, suppose now 
that there are those who, in the present age, praise the ways of Yao, Shun, 
Tang, and Yu. They would certainly be ridiculed by new sages. Therefore, 
sages neither seek to emulate the ancients nor attempt to establish a fixed 
standard of what should be constantly considered acceptable. They ex­
amine the affairs of their age, and adapt to them by creating appropriate 
measures.
Among the people of Song there was a farmer, and in the middle of his 
field there stood a tree trunk. One day a hare ran into the trunk, broke its 
neck, and died. Based on this happening, the farmer cast aside his plough 
and kept guard at the trunk, hoping he would obtain another hare. But he 
never obtained another hare, and he became the laughing stock of the state 
of Song. Now suppose someone wished to use the political measures of the 
Former Kings to govern the people of the present age; it would be the equiv­
alent of keeping guard at a tree trunk.
Simply put, there are no fixed standards to follow that can guarantee suc­
cess in all times and contexts. Measures, or modes of action, must respond to 
the specificities of the situation and be constantly adapted to ever-changing 
circumstances. There is no room for inflexible guidelines for behavior: the 
world changes, and human action must change along with the world. For 
this reason, the sage ruler does not decide his actions according to what was
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customary in past socio-material conditions, but rather “adapts his public 
affairs to the epoch in which he lives” -WHM'tS.2 “Five Vermins” (“Wudu” 
31W) continues to prove this point with more anecdotes, crystallizing in the 
expressions “different epochs require different actions” WM, and
“different actions require a change in measures” WHWJW'SL3
“Five Vermins” is among the early Chinese texts that show greater aware­
ness of the key role of material conditions in people’s socio-ethical life. 
Reflecting on differences in demography, resources, and the relative social 
importance of political positions, it argues that the ancients belittling ma­
terial goods was not due to their superior virtue but to the superabundance 
of material goods. Similarly, the struggle for resources does not make the 
authors contemporaries vulgar: it reflects their current state of scarcity.4 
Peoples socio-ethical behavior reflects, like a mirror, the material conditions 
of their times. This argument sets the basis to consider the material contin­
gency of values and standards of action which are often taken as necessary 
and absolute. For accurately reading the past, especially when attempting to 
use it as a model against which to judge the present, it is necessary to contex­
tually interpret past events through the lens of the socio-material conditions 
that facilitated certain attitudes and hindered others. The Han Feizi discloses 
a hermeneutic principle of timeless relevance: do not interpret the past 
within the confines of present values.
Although “Five Vermins” is a political text, the parable of the hare invites 
us to think that adapting was not solely a strategy for rulers. The topos of 
abandoning the past as an idealized standard by which to judge and guide 
present action reappears throughout the Han Feizi. The image of Wang Shou 
c£W, a burdened man who walks with difficulty as he carries the heavy 
weight of the past on his back, represented by a box of bamboo writings, is as 
emblematic as the image of the hare. Wang Shou burns his books and dances 
in uncumbered joy after being told that “public affairs are actions, and actions 
emerge from specific moments; those who understand this know that there 
are no constant affairs” Models of
action that carry the prescriptive authority of the past, such as those fossil­
ized in writings, hinder agents’ ability to walk the paths they encounter in 
life. Conceived in and for different times, old models have become obsolete 
for the world is in constant change.
The parable of the hare gives us the false impression that waiting for the 
hare cannot be used as an efficacious strategy in later instantiations because of 
its fortuitous character; after all, the hare’s death was the result of an arbitrary 
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event which may never be replicated in the future. This is, however, not the 
point of the parable in the way it is framed in the Han Feizi passage.6 As we 
see in the anecdotes early king narrations, the kings’ actions were all well- 
planned strategies that responded to the contextual needs of their people. 
The measures these kings proposed were far from random, rooted in specific 
socio-material problems. The reason why the kings’ measures should not 
be taken as reproducible strategies for efficacious action is the same reason 
why they were efficacious at their own time: they were ad hoc responses to 
specific, impermanent, and nongeneralizable sets of circumstances. The pas­
sage equates current rulers who wish to use former rulers’ measures to solve 
today’s problems with the obviously naive and laughable farmer from Song in 
a rhetorical move to expose the inadequacy and foolishness of such thinking 
through reductio ad absurdum.
Lack of Constant Standards
The parable of the hare is hilarious because it plays with absurdity. Through 
humor, the anecdote gains adherence to its philosophical tenets. While all 
readers will joyfully agree that only a fool would “keep guard at a tree trunk” 
(shou zhu vftt), the behavior that the anecdote denounces is, however, not 
uncommon. The search for reliable standards to guide human action is a 
common human tendency. In early China, these standards were often based 
on virtues such as humanity (ren t) and propriety (yi jg). As a compound, 
although differently defined, renyi appears in most of the masters’ texts. 
Following the anecdote of the hare, “Five Vermins” offers an illustration of 
how acritical adherence to fixed values leads to loss: “King Wen acted ac­
cording to humanity and propriety, by virtue of which he ruled All under 
Heaven, whereas King Yan acted according to humanity and propriety, by 
virtue of which he lost his state. This demonstrates that humanity and pro­
priety were useful in antiquity but not in current days. That is why I say that 
different epochs require different actions.”7 The author’s rationale is that, in 
antiquity, competition was ruled by morality, whereas in his current day it is 
ruled by sheer use of force. Therefore, King Yan would have needed a strong 
army to protect his state.8 The rules of the game having changed, agents 
should not use old strategies; not even strategies based on ethical values that 
are often, but mistakenly, considered to be absolute; that is, not contingent on 
changes in time, space, and socio-material conditions.
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Another typical early Chinese standard for acting is the value of usefulness 
or employability (keyong nJffl). Employability, the promise to perform well 
in particular tasks, was an important feature to display in early Chinese soci­
opolitical relations for candidates considering office. Acting in ways that vis­
ually display one’s usefulness enhances the possibilities of being employed in 
relevant positions, although it does not guarantee success: “There are things 
that gentlemen can do and others that they cannot do.... They can act so as 
to show that they are employable, but they cannot cause others to necessarily 
put them to use.... Hence they would be ashamed of showing inability, but 
they are not ashamed to remain unused.”9 Another problem is that rulers de­
cide on the officers’ employability through appearances and rhetorical games 
rather than on empirical grounds.10 In any case, the general consensus is that 
the agent is benefitted by projecting an image of usefulness.
Nevertheless, the Zhuangzi famously debated, displaying usefulness is not 
invariably applicable in all sorts of circumstances. There are contexts that re­
quire precisely the opposite: opacity, invisibility, unfathomability, and even 
an open statement of one’s lack of skills and resources.11 The latter is the case 
of the trees of harsh wood and twisted branches which can avoid the ax and 
live out their years (zhong qi tian nian A A A) precisely because humans 
cannot utilize their timber to build things. These trees find personal utility 
(self-preservation) in their lack of utility from a human instrumental per­
spective (employability).12 Further examples of this clash of perspectives are 
“oxen with white foreheads, pigs with turned-up snouts, and humans with 
piles disease,” all of them inauspicious beings to sacrifice to the River who 
find their luck in social rejection.13 Similar is the case of the infamous char­
acter Crooked Shu who made a living by washing clothes and sifting
rice and thus saved himself from war because of his radical lack of physical 
normalcy. Social conventions equate normalcy with usefulness and em­
ployability, which make normalcy desirable. And yet, like the crooked trees, 
Crooked Shu got to live and let others live thanks to being perceived as a use­
less outcast on the margins of productive society.14
One standard favors displaying usefulness in order to be employed and 
socially valued (a conception of self-benefit as social capital); the other favors 
uselessness precisely to avoid being utilized (a conception of self-benefit 
as self-preservation). With these apparently irreconcilable standards, the 
chosen model of action would seem to follow as a natural consequence of the 
agent’s prior worldview and values. The Zhuangzi complicates this picture. 
While “Among Humans” AfWttt calls into question the established value of 
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usefulness through the stories of outcasts, “Mountain Trees” ill A introduces 
a new twist by challenging the counter-value of uselessness. In its opening 
anecdote, the character of Zhuangzi takes advantage of his disciples’ puz­
zlement toward two seemingly contradictory experiences to explain that no 
single course of action can always be efficacious, not even when it conforms 
to values considered invariably cherishable. Agents must decide whether to 
display their worthiness or lack of ability according to circumstance, which 
entails that no value must be taken in the abstract as an absolute guide to plan 
one’s behavior.
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Zhuangzi was walking in the mountains when he saw a big tree with strong 
branches and luxurious foliage. A woodcutter was standing right next 
to the tree and yet did nothing to take it. (Zhuangzi) asked why, and (the 
woodcutter) replied: “There is no way to use it.” Zhuangzi said: “This tree 
gets to live out its years precisely for its lack of value.”
The teacher (and his disciples) left the mountains and stayed in the house 
of an old friend. The old friend was delighted (with the company), so he 
ordered his servant to kill a goose and boil it. The boy asked: “There is one 
that can honk and another that cannot. Which one should I kill?” The host 
replied: “Kill the one that cannot honk.”
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The next day, the disciples asked Zhuangzi: “The mountain tree that we saw 
yesterday got to live out its years because of its lack of value; and yet the 
host’s goose died also because of its lack of value. Which position would 
you take, sir?”
Zhuangzi replied laughing: “I could place myself in a position between 
value and lack of value. This position between value and lack of value could 
seem the most (appropriate), but it is not, because it would not prevent me 
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from encountering difficulties. It would be different, however, if I could 
ride the potency of the dao and thereby float and roam; without pain or 
glory, now a dragon and now a snake, transforming along with the mo­
ment, never willing to maintain a single course of action.”
Zhuangzi’s disciples do not react against the first teaching involving the 
useless tree that gets to enjoy its lifespan to the fullest. It falls within the 
parameters of their master’s counterintuitive thinking and their shared phi­
losophy of life. They show a reaction, however, after witnessing an event that 
escapes the Zhuangzian notion of the utility of the useless: the killing of a 
voiceless goose.
Geese are a topical image in early Chinese literature and poetry that 
represents strict migratory patterns and, by extension, changing seasonal 
practices and the cyclical passage of time. Given that one of their most 
symbolic features is their loud vocalizations during flight in flocks, poetry 
qualifies their calls as harmonious, in pair with human sounds of melan­
choly and sadness. More importantly, households used geese as intruder 
alarms. In the instrumental eyes of humans, a goose that cannot honk has 
lost half its character and all of its immediate utility, rendering it worth­
less as a tree whose timber cannot be transformed into furniture. If the 
goose that cannot honk is the useless one—namely the one that appar­
ently adheres to the Zhuangzian value of uselessness that prevents harm— 
then how come it was the one that got killed? The disciples are right to 
be puzzled and to inquire from their master which position would be 
better to take (chu when aiming at self-preservation: showing worth 
or worthlessness?
Zhuangzi’s laugh illuminates that the question is framed in the wrong 
way. His disciples take each event as a patterned norm, destroying their 
unique and unrepeatable character. They establish a dichotomy (x vs. non- 
x) in which displaying a particular value must always have either a positive 
or negative consequence. They want a fixed rule to act under all possible 
circumstances. Zhuangzi, in turn, aims to escape the dualism by avoiding 
both extremes much as the middle point, for the latter still approves of the 
legitimacy of the dichotomy. He expresses the movement beyond ordinary 
right-wrong dualist judgments (shifei through the image of riding the
dao, which is all potency and remains unbound by particular forms. Equally 
unbound, Zhuangzi aims at transforming along with the moment and to 
“never be willing to maintain a single course of action” (w ken zhuan wei 
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SW? S). There is no standardized model to decide on the actions that will 
bring success to our endeavors. One must learn to live in the all-embracing 
uncertainty and openness represented by the dao.16
The big tree and the honking goose did not choose their state of being. 
Their given features happened to be useful in a particular context. When 
applied to humans, the message becomes purposive and proactive. Being 
adaptive means that one might sometimes show instrumental qualities while 
other times display an absolute lack of them. Adapting precisely consists in 
not adhering to any particular standard of action and learning from context 
and situation which course would temporarily work best. Looking back at 
the tree anecdotes of “Among Humans” from this perspective, we realize that 
the value of usefulness they vindicate is not an absolute value. Agents must 
not be constrained by conventional thinking that represents certain things 
as good and others as bad. But they must not fall into the opposite extreme 
of unconventionality either. The risk of polarizing is that agents get trapped 
in yet another fallacy. The key lies in the capacity to acknowledge that all 
patterns of action can be useful at certain times and contexts. The efficacy of 
human actions lies with knowing how to situationally decide the best course 
possible given certain structural goals. In order to do so, agents must some­
times bracket values and standards.
Constitutive Standards versus Structural Goals
The Zhuangzi’s proposal of adaptive agency is more radical than the Han 
Feizi’s. “Five Vermins” argues for the heterogeneity of standards between 
different epochs (shi tft), a term that encapsulates a large span of time with 
semi-stable socio-material and cultural conditions. Within a single epoch, it 
also recognizes another kind of heterogeneity—conflicts between coexisting 
sources of motivation—but only to denounce that they pose a threat to an 
ordered society and a stable government.17 The ruler must disambiguate 
motivations and equalize all perspectives in accordance to the epochs semi­
stable socio-material conditions.
Beyond the heterogeneity of standards between epochs, the Zhuangzi 
observes constant micro-changes in a single space-time and even within 
oneself.18 The Zhuangzi places the heterogeneity of perspectives and values 
at the basis of the legitimacy of establishing multiple coexisting standards. 
Simultaneously, the heterogeneity of values lies at the basis for rejecting any 
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single particular standard as absolutely legitimate under all conditions. The 
Zhuangzi presents a more radical case of adaptability where the strategies for 
action cannot depend solely on the general tenets of an epoch; they must also 
adapt to rapidly changing circumstances. While in the Han Feizi we still find 
reliably stable patterns for establishing time-specific guidelines for action, 
the Zhuangzi opens our eyes to the fact that, even within a certain relatively 
stable cultural and political space-time, such as a reign, there is an endless va­
riety of micro-changes to consider on a daily basis. In choosing their actions, 
agents must therefore allow their standards to get dissolved into particular 
situations: not either pole of the dichotomy and neither the prudent middle 
path, but the openness and flexibility to choose among different possible 
paths depending on the circumstances.
To qualify this statement, we need to differentiate between constitu­
tive standards and structural goals. Constitutive standards are content­
dependent, defined by particular contents considered conducive for a good 
life. Structural goals, in turn, are content-neutral: ideals that can recogniz­
ably be achieved through different means. From the approach of adaptive 
agency, constitutive standards get dissolved in the situation as agents decide 
the most suitable course of action to fulfill a structural goal. Taking the pre­
vious passage as illustration, showing utility or lack thereof are constitutive 
standards to achieve the structural goal of self-preservation. Sticking to one 
of these content-based acting standards can only betray the agents expecta­
tions of efficacy. While agents often attain self-preservation through actions 
that hide ones abilities or openly demonstrate one’s instrumental uselessness, 
there are occasions where the opposite might be the case, as in the situation of 
the goose. In these cases, the constitutive standard of an adaptive agent gets 
dissolved into a particular situation and must be transformed, even radically, 
to its opposite. Nevertheless, the larger structural goal of self-preservation 
remains. Its attainment implies dissolving the previously established stan­
dardized way of acting. There is no single constitutive course of action that 
can guarantee fulfilling a structural goal under all possible conditions.19
Much like the Zhuangzi in the goose anecdote, who was unwilling to be 
confined within a conventional spectrum of action, the Confucius of the 
Analects discusses the sage as someone who changes standards according 
to situations. In a passage resembling the Mencius’s depiction of Confucius 
as the “timely sage” (shi zhi sheng Brfx'LlB), Confucius describes Bo Yi, Shu 
Qi, Liuxia Hui, and a number of other influential ethical and political fig­
ures by highlighting the constitutive moral standards by which each guided 
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their actions. In striking contrast to all of these figures, Confucius claims to 
transcend content-oriented principles. He does not govern himself by pre­
conceived standards of rightness, for these are impermanent. In Confucius’s 
words: “As for me, I differ from them all. I have no preconception about what 
can and cannot be”
Goldin has called this theme of situational change, which I am further 
conceptualizing as a feature of adaptive agency, “the primacy of the situa­
tion.”21 Goldin points at the following lines from Analects, which I offer you 
in his translation: “In his associations with the world, there is nothing that the 
noble man invariably affirms or denies. He is a participant of what is right” 
The gentlemans struc­
tural goal is to do what is right. However, what is right cannot be decided be­
forehand; there are no fixed standards that can guarantee doing the right thing 
under all circumstances.
Reading the Analects, we witness Confucius changing his advice (i.e., guiding 
standards) depending on the disciple with whom he talks. When inquired 
about why he changes the response, Confucius points out each disciples char­
acter and how his advice would lead each to what is right according to their 
personalities.23 The abstract question is always reconfigured by means of its 
context (including who asks and for which reasons), which relativizes it and 
particularizes it. Confucius would not answer an abstract question with an 
equally abstract rule. He would only respond to the particular circumstantial 
implications of the question based on the inquirer. We could call Confucius’s 
adaptive agency a sort of moral indexicality, where the right thing to do is only 
discernable from the perspective of the particular person seen as a point of ref­
erence relative to all the intersections around it.24 Constitutive standards trans­
form as the gentleman adaptively responds to the situations’ particularities, 
while the higher structural goal of doing what is right remains.
The Radical Question: How to Act?
An important question remains. If there are no fixed standards to decide how 
to achieve our goals, how can we act? The Lord of the River reflects on this 
question during his journey of self-realization in the “Autumn Floods” 
chapter of the Zhuangzi, an important text that encapsulates the popular 
Zhuangzian theme of the relativity and interdependence of the concepts of 
big and small to discuss perspectivism in epistemology, ethics, and action.25
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In the role of the master, Ruo, the god of the North Sea, explains that 
knowledge is always partial and incomplete, hence insufficient to establish 
constant standards (ni {5E).26 Every value, perspective, or standard is bound 
by its own set of circumstances.
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A well frog cannot be expected to discuss the sea, for it is confined to its 
own space. A summer insect cannot be expected to discuss ice and cold, for 
it concentrates in its own season. A biased scholar cannot be expected to 
discuss the dao, for he is bound to his own teaching.
The problem is not with being bound, an inevitable feature of finite and de­
termined entities (wu). It lies with not acknowledging one’s own finitude and 
binds, for this lack of epistemological self-awareness leads to clouded igno­
rance, which triggers absolutist views. Applying a perspectivist corrective to 
one’s way of knowing and perceiving the world should not lead to replacing 
a previously accepted epistemic framework with a new one. The result of the 
corrective is understanding that every single standard, old and new, conven­
tional or countercultural, is contingent and provisional. Never constant, and 
never final, standards only make sense for particular situations through a 
partial perspective.28
Extrapolating from epistemology and ethics to the question of agency, the 
Lord of the River asks the crucial question:
?29
If we establish this as a fact, then how should I act? And how should I not 
act? I must accept and reject, prefer and discard. How should I ultimately 
manage to do all this?
Up to this point, the conversation had remained at the level of making 
distinctions, evaluating things, and learning a new epistemological ap­
proach: how and what we know about the world. This had ethical implications 
on the relativity and impermanence of values, which quickly found their way 
into the more practical question of how to act on an ordinary basis, pressed 
by the immediacy of a present that requires making choices. As Meyer 
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summarizes, “for the first time, there is an attempt to translate the epistemo­
logical angst of the interlocutor into a philosophy of praxis: what is it that we 
should do in a world with no absolute standards and categories?”30
Ruo directs our attention to the dao. Source and nurturer of all entities, 
the dao cannot itself be an entity. While entities are bound by their own 
physical and psychological boundaries, the dao is formless, all-embracing, 
and equanimous, without preference. Interpreting the formlessness of the 
dao as a philosophy of action, Ruo recommends acting “without a method” 
(wtifang ) in a world without standards.
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Do not limit your actions to one way only; participate in the duo’s irreg­
ularity and unevenness. Be severe like the ruler to his state, granting no 
biased favors. Be bountiful like the deity’s altar in its ceremony, granting no 
biased blessings. Be overflowing like the endlessness of the four directions, 
making no boundaries nor distinctions. Impartially embrace the ten thou­
sand kinds of entities—which would deserve special shelter? This is what 
I call being without a method.... The life of an entity is like the gallop and 
speeding of a horse; there is no movement that doesn’t come along with a 
change; there is no time that doesn’t come along with an alteration. [As for 
the questions you were asking] How to act? How not to act? It is clear that 
one must transform oneself.
We see again in these passages an emphasis on not acting in the conven­
tional way while also avoiding turning the unconventional into a new fixed 
standard. Becoming a countercultural agent will not save one from trouble. 
The adaptive agent is not the one who abandons the comfort of the conven­
tionally established for its risky and unorthodox negation in an assumed 
dichotomy. Nor is he the one who rests in a moderate middle path. The adap­
tive agent embraces all possible courses of action and uses them as needed, 
relieving the temporarily selected modes of action of their moral superi­
ority and ontological necessity, and the temporarily discarded ones of their 
moral inferiority and ontological shame. Notice that fang fj or “method” 
also means “place” or “location” (as in the “four directions”: si fang ES^).
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Not having a method involves not being tied to any particular location, not 
getting stuck in a fixed position, rooted to a place and unable to move, hence 
unable to act and wander (xing and you ^).
Returning to the Rivers crucial question, Ruo concludes that “it is clear 
that one must transform oneself.”32 Zhuangzi editor and philosopher Guo 
Xiang WS- (252-312) comments this line: “As long as we stay in (the di­
chotomy) between acting thus or not acting thus, we defeat our capacity 
for self-transformation” § ft.^:.33 The unwill­
ingness to be trapped in dualistic thinking along with the advocacy for the 
transformation of one’s approach to standards of action reminds us of an­
other passage where the narrator suggests that “rather than praising Yao and 
blaming Jie, it would be better to forget both (options/models) and transform 
our way (of thinking and living)”
Namely, transform our inherent belief that choosing one option at one par­
ticular time excludes the viability of taking the opposite path. Agents must 
stop thinking in dualistic terms that endow choices with unwarranted sub­
stance. Transforming one’s understanding of the nature of agency itself, 
which will have radical consequences for how to answer the question of how 
to act, is what the text calls “not having a method.”
And yet there is a method. The method of not acting according to any par­
ticular method: an open structure that allows one to be temporarily guided 
and filled with a plurality of mutually replacing constitutive standards and 
courses of action.
Adapting: A Meta-Model of Action
Adapting is not descriptive of the content of an action but indicative of a pro­
cedural method for performing actions that respond to the specificities of a 
situation. What shapes an adaptive action is not its content (what is done) nor 
its goal (why it is done), but the means by which an action responds to the 
demands of a situation (how it is planned: the procedure). This implies that all 
sorts of actions can be adaptive as long as the means-ends relations are planned 
as adjusted, ad hoc responses to situational factors. Consequently, there is no 
single model for acting adaptively. Adaptive agency precisely requires that the 
agent adheres to no particular model and changes her parameters for deciding 
how to act in accordance with each given situation. In this way, adapting is 
not a course or model of action. It operates on a different plane: a method for 
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producing an endless number of adaptive actions; a meta-model of action in 
which many different courses of action can be incorporated.
The latter point is best illustrated in a piece from the Huainanzi WA, 
which features Confucius as the adaptive agent par excellence.
A»?a: r»M?j0: j r
a& ? j 0; rma& . . j ra* ? j
S : riAtfeo J WH : rHAWSAT , ffiMAA
A AB : , ra , Ifi'Ko
E-ii, smtiA j ?LT^m±tiio35
Someone asked Confucius: “What kind of person is Yan Hui?” Confucius 
replied: “A humane person. Qiu [Confucius] does not equal him.” “What 
kind of person is Zigong?” Confucius replied: “An argumentative person. Qiu 
does not equal him.” “What kind of person is Zilu?” Confucius replied: “A 
courageous person. Qiu does not equal him.” The guest said: “The three are 
worthier than you, Master, yet they act as your disciples, why?” Confucius 
said: “Qiu can be humane and severe, argumentative and stammering, coura­
geous and cowardly. If Qiu could trade the capacities of these three students 
for Qiu’s single dao, Qiu wouldn’t do it.” Confucius knew how to apply [these 
capacities].
In each case, Confucius declares to be less advanced than his disciples 
in the cultivation and performance of a characteristic virtue. Yet what 
Confucius lacks turns into his advantage. The narrator of this exemplary 
dialogue establishes a difference between having certain valuable abilities 
and knowing how to apply them properly. While Yan Hui is more humane 
than Confucius, he is always humane, even in circumstances that would re­
quire from him to be severe. Zigong is more courageous than Confucius, but 
Confucius knows how to behave cowardly when that would be a more fitting 
attitude. Confucius describes his dao as an adaptive one: he can act differ­
ently according to different circumstances. Confucius’ dao is unitary (yi —•), 
despite involving a number of different behaviors. His method of agency is 
not defined by the numerous discrete abilities he can display (neng ft) but 
by his capacity to display them adaptively (dao il). While each ability allows 
for high performance of corresponding courses of action, Confucius’s uni­
tary method of agency can accommodate an endless number of constitutive 
courses of action. This is what I call a meta-model of action: an open model 
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that serves to establish constitutive models of action but that is not restricted 
nor defined by any single one of them.
The text follows with a fable meant to reinforce the meaning of Confucius’s 
adaptive dao. Niu Que of Qin HAM is attacked and robbed by bandits 
while crossing the mountains, yet he does not seem bothered. Disturbed by 
the victims lack of emotional reaction, the bandits inquire into his unusual 
attitude. Niu Que explains that what the bandits have removed from him are 
external and irrelevant things, leaving intact his physical and moral integrity. 
The bandits decide to kill the wise Niu Que, fearing that he would prosecute 
them as criminals. The anecdote concludes,
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This shows that one may act wisely with the wise, but should not act wisely 
with the unwise. One can be brave with the courageous, but should not be 
brave with the cowardly. Those who have the dao respond ceaselessly to all 
situations yet are never lacking. When encountering difficulty, they are able 
to avoid it; therefore, All under Heaven esteems them. In this case, [Niu 
Que] understood how to act out of his own accord, but he did not yet un­
derstand how to act in accord with other people. The means of his consid­
erations were not penetrating enough. When people can start from clarity 
and reach obscurity, they are close to the dao. An ode says: “People have a 
saying: no wise man is not also a fool.” This is its meaning.
The wise becomes a fool when his untimely display of wisdom turns against 
himself. Sages like Confucius know how to adapt to their audience and 
how to situationally employ their virtues and abilities. As we saw in the 
Analects, Confucius does not hold a constant response to each abstract 
question: questions must become embodied, localized, concretized into 
particulars if they are to create adapted contextual solutions.
A third depiction of Confucius as an adaptive agent appears in the 
Mengzi j£~F.
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Mencius said: “Bo Yi was the pure sage. Yi Yin was the devoted sage. Liu 
Xia Hui was the accommodating sage. Confucius was the timely sage.”
The purest among sages, Bo Yi would never do anything that he con­
sidered incorrect. The most devoted sage, Yi Yin would never refuse to 
serve, even under a corrupt ruler. Liu Xia Hui is the accommodating one, 
who could do as well among poverty as in richness. As opposed to these 
three, characterized for a constant trait, Confucius knows what is appro­
priate to do at each time, “the one who hurried when it was proper to do so, 
delayed the actions when it was proper to do so, stayed behind when it was 
proper to do so, and took office when it was proper to do so.”38 Confucius 
stands out among the other sages for his inconstancy. Yet his inconstancy 
is not random; switches in plans are decided by fitness to time and context 
(keyi nJx er ffilx).
Confucius is described as an adaptive agent with no constant standards 
to follow. In all three unorthodox depictions of Confucius, the sage adheres 
to a meta-model of action: a structure defined by its adaptive procedure to 
produce endless constitutive courses of action which are modeled as inti­
mate responses to specific situations but which can never become constant 
standards nor fully replace the structure itself.
Howto Train in Adaptability: Theory and Praxis
To explain how to act “without a method” and yet produce endless con­
stitutive strategies of action ad hoc without letting any of them define 
the agent, I will use the Zhuangzi’s “Treatise on Equalizing Entities” 
(“Qiwulun” This treatise is one of the most philosophically
complex pieces in the early Chinese corpus and the most explicit in terms 
of exposing the procedure of adaptive action. While other early sources 
point at similar ideas of epistemic neutrality, perspectivism, emptiness, 
and responsivity, the Treatise remains the best exposition of a doctrine 
that finds several variations during the classical period of philosophy 
in China.
The Treatise explains the grounds of methodical perspectivism and the 
epistemological stance that enables acting adaptively as one of epistemic 
neutrality. The passage here discusses perspectivism and the theory of co­
dependent origination of the opposites (fangsheng zhi shuo 
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Among entities, there is none that cannot be seen from “that” position, and 
none that cannot also be seen from “this” position. From “that” position, 
[“this” position] cannot be seen. Depending on which position you ap­
proach something from, you will know an aspect or another of it. Therefore, 
it is said: “that” position comes from “this” position, and “this” position also 
exists because of “that” position. [The existence of] “this” and “that” is what 
we call co-dependent origination. Although that is the case, as entities live 
they die, and as they die, they come to life again; entities that are possible 
are also impossible, and being impossible, possible they become; having 
reasons to affirm is having reasons to deny, and those reasons to deny mean 
that there are reasons to affirm.
Therefore, the sage does not proceed from this (vicious circle of co­
dependence), but is illuminated from Heaven so that his “this” is adaptive. His 
“this” is now a “that,” and his “that” is then a “this.” His “that” includes some­
thing to affirm and something to deny, and his “this” also includes something to 
affirm and to deny. So, in fact, does he still have a “that” and “this”? Or does he 
not have a “that” and “this” anymore? When “this” and “that” do not find them­
selves as opposite positions, this is called the axis of the dao. The axis obtains its 
position at the center of the circle, from where it responds without limits. His 
affirming also responds without limits, and his denying also responds without 
limits. Therefore, it is said: “There is nothing like using clarity.”
Perspectivism is the theory that knowing is a partial exercise limited by the per­
spective from which we approach an entity. When faced with the same phenom­
enon, different perspectives will lead to different perceptions, whether these are 
of a physical, an ethical, or a theoretical nature. Positions and value judgments 
belong to human perspective, not to entities. They all have grounds on which 
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they are formulated, therefore they can be said to coexist. Simultaneously, dif­
ferent positions only gain meaning when understood in opposition to one an­
other, which this passage terms “co-dependent origination.”40
If different positions justify different judgments, and they are all poten­
tially possible, it follows that there is nothing absolute or ultimate about our 
perception of the world, but just perspectives and contextual, contingent, 
relative, and impermanent coexisting truths. Nevertheless, the passage con­
tinues, when socialized into a particular cultural environment and world­
view, humans become blind to all the others, which sets the roots for the 
nonsensical vicious circle of disputation (bian ffi). Taking their own partial 
and limited perspective as the only and absolute truth, they enter a game of 
rhetoric that leads to a vicious circle: as one denies, the other affirms, an af­
firmation that gives way to a new negation, which creates the grounds for a 
new affirmation, and so on. The problem with the ideas advocated by other 
thinkers is not that they are wrong or implausible, but rather that they are 
partial and yet taken to be the only correct option.
The realization that all our perceptions, beliefs, and judgments are a 
matter of perspective challenges absolutism and leads to perceiving phe­
nomena with neutrality. As the Treatise reads, “All entities necessarily 
have what makes them so. All entities necessarily have what makes them 
possible. There is no entity that is not so. There is nothing that cannot be” 
From the dao's 
phenomenological approach, all that appears has equal right to do so, even 
opposing views, beliefs, and perceptions. The plurality of human and non­
human paths (dao IM) is original and irreducible. By virtue of existing, all 
options are legitimate options, yet none of them tells us the whole story of 
the world of phenomena. Although all paths have the right to appear, none of 
them has the right to claim itself as absolute and ultimate.
The second part of the passage argues that the sage prevents perspectivism 
from degenerating into a self-defeating relativism that would keep him from 
making choices. The Treatise fights both absolutism and relativism. The fact 
that plural paths coexist and that they all have grounds on which to be estab­
lished (i.e„ that they are natural and legitimate) does not entail that they are 
all morally right nor always valid. In other words, nothing about the natu­
ralness and phenomenal legitimacy of perspectives, values, and paths makes 
them right, not in moral nor instrumental terms.
Just as ordinary people, the sage of the Treatise also affirms (shi z^), that 
is, takes positions, makes judgments, and chooses concrete courses of action.
28 ADAPTING
But the sage escapes from the vicious circle of disputation by affirming and 
negating in a way different from ordinary peoples: his affirming is adaptive 
(yinshi K^). Analyzing the metaphor of the circle or “axis of dao” (daoshu 
where the sage takes position, helps us understand how the agent affirms 
adaptively.42 Points in a circle are not mutually exclusive. Instead of under­
standing different positions as binary opposites of which only one can prevail, 
situating positions in a circle helps us see them as nonexclusive and coexisting. 
Given these non-mutually exclusive and coexisting positions, how does the 
centered sage interact with them? How does the sage choose how to act? First, 
the center of the circle is at the exact same distance from every single point that 
can be traced on it. From the center, the sage has equal access to every single 
position and is capable of using them all. Second, the number of points that can 
be traced is infinite—a quality the sage parallels with his limitless capacity of 
response (w qiong Mfi). Third, as Guo Xiang remarks, the center of the circle 
is empty (kong St), for what we are translating as a circle was probably a jade 
ring.43 The feature of emptiness speaks of the epistemic neutrality of the sage, 
who does not show preferences for any individual perspective or value judg­
ment a priori. The sage has equal access to every single perspective from which 
to judge phenomena and can respond to them all with neutrality and without 
being influenced by them in turn. Finally, the center is but one more point of 
the space endorsed by the circle, but it enjoys a privileged position.
This suggests that the difference between the sage and ordinary people 
(who cling to partial perspectives as if they were absolute) is not one of na­
ture, but of epistemic perspective. The sage’s epistemic perspective is termed 
“illuminated by Heaven” and “finding clarity.” The images of light, clarity, 
and discernment refer to the realization that all positions are valid yet do not 
allow this realization to lead to an action-impeding relativism. Each posi­
tion and action are distinct and definitive, unambiguous. The sage can take 
one position each time—the most fitting according to the situation—while 
keeping the flexibility to change positions, perspectives, and judgments 
when it is necessary under certain situational conditions.44
The monkey keeper is presented as an illustration of the person with dis­
cernment or clarity (mingHfi) who, located at the epistemic center, can take 
situationally adaptive positions (affirm this or that).
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The monkey keeper was handing out nuts, saying: “Three in the morning 
and four in the evening.” The monkeys were all furious. The monkey 
keeper said: “If so, then four in the morning and three in the evening.” The 
monkeys were all delighted. There was no discrepancy in what he originally 
claimed he would do (ming fa), and what he eventually did (shi jf), but joy 
and anger were put to use [in the monkey keeper’s decisions], which is also 
a case of affirming adaptively. Thus, the sage harmonizes with entities by 
means of affirming and negating, and rests on the heavenly potter’s wheel. 
This is what is called “walking both [paths].”
Each of the choices that the monkey keeper offers represents one distinct, 
constitutive, partial, inflexible, and unambiguous position. Like stubborn 
absolutists, the monkeys can only agree with one of these positions, pas­
sionately rejecting its opposite. The monkey keeper also takes a distinct po­
sition each time, but he is flexible and open to change his “affirming” when 
necessary.46
Returning to the metaphor of the circle, from his location at the center, 
the monkey keeper has a unique perspective from which to view all pos­
sible options and design means to reconcile or accommodate them. The per­
spective of the center is not a transcendental or final perspective, such as 
the eye of god. Instead, the center allows one to understand the grounds on 
which agents make choices, to approach the infinite network of possibilities 
wherein one is embedded while not committing to any of them. The axis 
of the dao is not external to the social network in which all humans func­
tion. The Treatise’s authors make this clear when they interrogate their own 
positions, acknowledging that, as any other, they are part of the intricate 
web of paths in which all entities are immersed and from which they cannot 
escape.
At the center, the adaptive agent represented by the monkey keeper 
recognizes the partial understanding of the monkeys (xiao zhi 
and works with it from a larger perspective (da zhi which the pas­
sage phrases “walking both paths at the same time” (Jiang xing^YY'). Most 
scholars interpret Hang xing as being flexible (offering now three and four, 
then four and three), a commitment to walking not only one’s own path but 
other people’s, too, in order to better understand and accommodate other 
perspectives. It may also refer to being able to simultaneously use the two 
types of understanding. The adaptive agent overcomes both absolutism (as 
he can appreciate things from different perspectives) and relativism (as he 
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can make decisions and engage in efficacious action). As a meta-model for 
action, adaptive agency produces courses of action that are both provisional 
and definitive. They are definitive for a particular situation since a clear 
stance is taken and acted upon. From a larger perspective, nonetheless, these 
courses of action are temporary.
Educating in Adaptive Agency
All there is left from the wise figures of the past—early kings and sages—is a 
narration of their actions by later-day scholars, an account of the regulations 
and measures they established, or at best a short quotation of their words. We 
seldom have access to the reasons why they thus spoke or the means by which 
they decided to enforce certain regulations in detriment to others. Through 
written accounts, the great feats of culture heroes and sage kings stay in the 
collective memory, but the situations and thinking processes (suoyi 0TlU) 
that led them to act in the way they did are missing.47 This is the point of the 
Huainanzi when it says that “The regulations of the sages can be comprehended, 
but the means by which they raised these regulations cannot be traced” 
, M0T AMIMttL.48 Geaney reflects on the fact that
these invisible processes account for the capacity to produce successful actions 
that are attuned to the situation to which they respond.49 Even if recorded, an 
adapted course of action is but an individual illustration of a past efficacious be­
havior, which can never become a model to follow. In other words, what counts 
is not the action per se, but the capacity to act adaptively in each given occasion. 
This capacity, or suoyi, at the basis of the meta-model of adaptive agency re­
mains what can hardly be transmitted and yet what must be learned.
In response to texts that discuss the impossibility to transmit an 
unperceivable suoyi, Geaney says that “teaching itself is at fault because— 
whether in speech or action—adjusting and responding to circumstances 
cannot be taught.”50 I would say, nonetheless, that the transmission of the 
suoyi of adaptive agency constitutes precisely the point of teaching in early 
China, the reason why many early texts show concern with the difficulties in­
volved in transmitting the suoyi. Unless we are dealing with the transmission 
of technical knowledge such as astronomy or bronze casting, most educa­
tional texts in the classical period are concerned with teaching the capability 
to act and adapt to different situations. Teaching manuals and encyclopedias 
of knowledge such as Lunyu gft in, Sun Bin bingfa Lushi Chunqiu 
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S ft and Huainanzi, as well as parts of the Han Feizi present anecdotes 
showing how past figures reacted to situations, whether it is speaking in an 
attuned manner or responding to a problem. The goal is not for students to 
repeat the exact instantiation of action; they must learn to identify relevant 
information from a situation in order to produce their own unique response. 
These texts often discuss the need for adapting in explicit terms. They were 
structured in a way conducive to educate one in adaptive responsivity. They 
confronted the student with a multiplicity of situations, as well as with suc­
cessful and unsuccessful ways of handling each one of them. Rather than 
teaching a particular content, they trained a capacity. From repeatedly 
discussing and interpreting these anecdotes, probably together with a master 
and colleagues, students would learn the ropes of adaptive agency.
Beyond the pedagogical master-disciples model that involves discussing 
situations, another way of educating in adaptive agency was through perfor­
mative texts. An example is found in a Western Han manuscript excavated 
at Mawangdui in the early seventies, Entities Necessarily Have Forms
Chart (Wu zeyou xing tu hereafter WZYX).51 Composed as a
chart (tu ffl), it had the function “not just to reflect or embody the way the 
world was configured, but also to facilitate and engineer correct modes of per­
ceiving it.”52 Tu were not only performative texts—that is, texts that performed 
their own theoretical content—they also were texts that helped the reader act 
in certain ways deemed efficacious as a result of a given knowledge and per­
ception of the world.53 In the case of WZYX, the philosophical content that 
the text performed and helped the reader perform was adaptive agency.
The main philosophical tenets of the manuscript resonate with other early 
texts that advocate adapting. (1) Entities have particular forms, and relations 
constitute particular structures. (2) Acting always is co-acting, interacting, 
or responding. (3) As a result, there are appropriate ways to interact with cer­
tain entities and their nets of relations. Responses or courses of action cannot 
be randomly decided nor based on individual preferences; they must adjust 
to the entities the agent is interacting with. The particularity of this manu­
script is that, apart from theoretically advocating for adaptive agency, it also 
affords readers opportunities to perform adaptive responses as they interact 
with the material text. Let us first examine the theory of action in the WZYX.
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A response comes from a stimulus; an action comes from a push. This is the 
pattern of the heart-mind [how the heart-mind works]. [This also implies 
that] Without a stimulus there is no response, and there is no push that 
is not followed by an action. If when the stimulus arrives, the response 
harmonizes with it, there is no inner. If you investigate and understand [the 
circumstances], and then forget about them, there is no outer.
A theory of adaptive action implies an interconnectedness between inner and 
outer, where there is neither an independent agent imposing a fully autono­
mous action upon an external world, nor an external world that is unable to 
come into the discrete inner realm of the agent. Agent and world are woven 
together, feeding one another—the reason why acting is always co-acting.
Any action the agent takes is a response to a series of relationships wherein 
he is embedded and which pushes (tui $£) and stimulates (gan ®). Actions 
must not be imposed (the forced wei ^), random and disharmonious (bu he 
'F'n , or self-centered (si ^A), but harmoniously co-created in asso­
ciation with the nets of relations established by the other entities involved. 
The agent’s action “has no inner” because it is not conceived in isolation or 
rejection of its context, and therefore it cannot be called a pure product of an 
atomistic mind. Neither are actions fully heteronomous, ruled by external 
demands or “outer.” The agent knowingly acts in accordance with an ephem­
eral set of circumstances which he is ready to leave behind right after the fact. 
Oblivious to the external set of stimuli which demanded a particular course 
of action in the past, the agent is newly empty to take in a new situational 
configuration with which to interact in his next endeavor. Adaptive actions 
are the result of subject and world rising together in harmony: the ephemeral 
kiss of a continuously changing encounter.
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If there are entities, then necessarily there are forms; if there are entities, 
then necessarily there are names. If there are entities, then necessarily there 
are words; if there are words, then it is possible to speak (about them).
The manuscript discusses adapting from the point of view of both visible 
actions and aural speech. The defining characteristic of an entity is to have 
physical boundaries or forms (xing J^). Since entities inherently have par­
ticular features that make them discrete, entities must also have particular 
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names (ming and ways of speaking about them (yan W). Much like ac­
tion, or precisely as a type of action (speech acts that make things happen), 
speech must be adjusted to the entities it describes. This text opposes pat­
terned and absolutized forms of speech, rendered irrelevant in the best case 
and dangerous in the worse, and advocates for forms of speech that are self- 
aware of their socio-material and spatio-temporal binds, able to adapt to 
situation-embedded entities and to co-rise with the world.
Waring discusses the transition from the empirical ze III (if x, then nec­
essarily y) to the normative ke M (possible, allowable, appropriate); that is, 
from the observation of how things are to the legitimacy of a certain course 
of action. We have seen the same transition in the Zhuangzi’s Treatise: the 
observation that entities necessarily appear and that they all have grounds on 
which to appear endows them with phenomenological legitimacy. We may 
also want to read a normative appropriateness of doing things in a certain 
way. It is appropriate to speak about entities as long as our speech is produced 
as an attuned response to the features (or forms) of the entities under discus­
sion.56 However, the fact that entities have names does not imply that names 
are fixed. Entities’ names will change as these embark on different kinds of 
correlations with other entities. Bound by their relationships to others, enti­
ties only exist in co-dependence with equally contingent and co-dependent 
entities, and therefore, as their names, they are bound to change.
Most interesting is how the arrangement of the text on the silk medium 
performs the message and affords readers the opportunity to become adap­
tive agents as they manipulate the manuscript. The agency of the material 
support and visual design of the text does not force but invites and affords 
readers to act in a certain way. As Waring has shown, readers must rotate the 
manuscript in their hands in a clockwise direction from the inside outward 
to decipher the written text.57 The gesture is like that of an adaptive agent 
responding to the temporary set of interrelations in which he is embedded 
when taking action. Each position represents a timely yet ephemeral en­
counter with the world. Reader-agents must react to each new position of 
the text captured on the physical manuscript as a new situation, adjusting 
eyes and actions to what stands in front of them, without prejudice or 
fixed responses. At the same time, each new position and each previously 
rehearsed course of action must be forgotten to avoid the formation of fixed 
patterns and to keep an empty heart-mind welcoming of new encounters. In 
the interaction reader-manuscript/agent-world, there is no outer that fully 
rules one’s behavior; neither is there inner ruling of the external world. The 
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order of the mind-heart comes from co-acting with the world, co-authoring 
agency as a shared effort of harmonization.
The purpose of the manuscripts design was to afford readers an edu­
cational experience of the change in positionality that is associated with a 
change in perspective and which hence must elicit different responses and 
modes of speech (what we have previously called “without a method,” wu 
fang )—both visual and aural forms of adaptive action. Since the man­
uscript demands to be manipulated in a certain way, the very fact of suc­
ceeding in reading it demonstrates a victory of adaptive agency.58 This is the 
main message of WZYX. One receives a particular stimulus, which leads to 
co-creating an action along with the source of stimulation—in this case a 
text. This action does not come fully from the outside (the text does not force 
the reader to read or rotate it). It does not come fully from the inside either 
(the reader does not independently decide to read the manuscript through a 
rotational operation). The successful reading of this text is a co-action. A co­
operation between inside and outside. There is a goal—to read the text—and 
there is an affordability of the texts features. It is only in the conjunction of 
both that an efficacious action might rise.
In reading the manuscript by rotating it, reader-agents are already doing 
what the text they attempt to decipher and understand teaches one must do. 
One must analyze the situation and come up with the best course of action 
along with all other agencies involved in it. Agents that succeed in reading 
the manuscript have already done that, and only after having done it can they 
read the words that suggest that they should do it. The text does not only teach 
how to act adaptively, but also evidently demonstrates that adapting is not an 
unreachable ideal for it can be done and the reader has already succeeded in 
doing it. This is the pedagogical force of the manuscript. Moreover, despite its 
philosophical content being quite widespread in the Warring States and Han 
periods, the manuscript makes an effort to transmit the suoyi (the means by 
which, or the how to) of adaptive agency and its feasibility.
In sum, there are two main platforms for educating in adaptive agency in 
early China: critical discussion of situations and scenes and performative 
texts. The discussion of situations and scenes involves the discernment of the 
processes previous to decision-making, as well as the consequences of cer­
tain kinds of actions under a given set of circumstances. Performative texts 
such as WZYX embodied their teaching and afforded readers an opportunity 
to perform adaptive actions themselves, moving from an armchair theoret­
ical exercise to the physical first-person experience of adaptive agency.
